Despite their divergence in organizing cyber capabilities, the three countries converge on the assumption that both responding to cyber conflict short of war and developing military cyber power are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. The Cyber Defense is responsible for conducting defensive cyber operations, and the Intelligence Service coordinates between offensive and defensive cyber operations. >> In the face of a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. The Norwegian organization of cyber capabilities is founded on a centralized model that dissolves the organizational distinction between military and intelligence entities. There is hence a need for increased attention and a focused approach to how the country-specific organizational model allows for operational capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which implications. Nurturing such debate is crucial to achieve the best decisions about how to organize and develop cyber capabilities, how to use it, and how to secure transparency and accountability. The Navy's community leader for Cryptology and Cyber Warfare released a new vision titled, "Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision" which serves as an aligning narrative for the community. In recent years, the DGSE has become more open about its work, but it remains a very secretive service (Chopin Citation2017: 546). JSCU is a collaboration between the two Dutch intelligence and security services the MIVD and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). /CropBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] The Netherlands Defence organisation deploys offensive digital resources exclusively against military targets. Aerial drones are increasingly being repurposed for domestic use and legislated for public and commercial purposes around the world. An official website of the United States government, Department of the Navy Cyberspace Superiority Vision, Climate Action 2030 Department of the Navy, VA Vet Center (Supports vets, service members, and their families), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, One Navy-Marine Corps Team: Strategic Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy, eport to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2022, After compiling and analyzing feedback from hundreds of Sailors through focus groups and surveys, Task Force One Navyin early 2021 submitted its final report, Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review, Comprehensive Review of the DON Uniformed Legal Communities, Department of the Navy Strategic Guidance FY 2020, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of the Navy's New Education Initiatives, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Version 2.0), Navy Leader Development Framework (Version 3.0), Readiness Reform Oversight Committee: One Year Later, Naval Research and Development: A Framework for Accelerating to the Navy and Marine Corps after Next, Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) Addendum to the Naval Research and Development Framework, US Fleet Cyber Command/ Tenth Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020, New Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision Released, SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review Letter, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 2020, Laying the Keel: Developing the Backbone of Our Navy, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at JFK Christening, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at Navy Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce, The President's Coronavirus Guidelines for America, US Navy Hospital Ship Leadership Biographies, Frequently asked questions about USNS Mercy, Frequently asked questions about USNS Comfort deployment to New York City, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. strategic picture to defend cyber key terrain to enable mission command. For more information, contact Joseph W. Kirschbaum at (202) 512- The "Naval Aviation Vision, 2016-2025" presents a unified U.S. Navy and Marine Corps roadmap to deliver the current readiness and future capability required of Naval Aviation in support of national strategy. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. The operational capability of the DCC is, however, hampered by its limited mandate that restricts the DCCs possibility to gather intelligence and conduct reconnaissance when not in war. >> Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference (Ecole militaire, Paris) (15 May 2018) Cyber Defence Pledge. Update: DoD Instruction 5000.02 "Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework" dated 23 January 2020 has been released. They suggest that strategy must be unshackled from the presumption that it deals only with the realm of coercion, militarised crisis, and war in cyberspace (Harknett and Smeets Citation2022, 2). 8 Fleet Secure Endpoint - installation and use 30 - Dashboard and alerting 30 - Fleet Secure Endpoint use in context 31 9 Cyber security, Crew Training and Awareness 32 10 Fleet Secure Endpoint - real case studies 34 11 Conclusion and Next Steps 36 White Paper Cyber security requirements for IMO 2021 CYBER SECURITY NATO Allies Offensive Cyber Policy : A Growing Divide ? What are the limitations, opportunities, and tensions? Reports (2018) Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO's Cyber Policy. >> /Filter /FlateDecode /Parent 2 0 R 11/16/2017 By Vivienne Machi . The UKs Cyber Strategy Is No Longer Just About Security. The Netherlands presented a military cyber doctrine in 2019. The COMCYBER is responsible for the military action chain. cybersecurity suffers from institutional frag-mentation and a weak financial base. /CropBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] Without the network, there is no Multi-Domain Battle. In the past decade, the defense cybersecurity strategies of the Netherlands have displayed the nations ambition to develop offensive cyber capabilities (Bunk and Smeets Citation2021; Claver Citation2018). 5 Howick Place | London | SW1P 1WG. The "Blueprint" for a coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at the Union level. Taillat (Citation2019) finds the ambiguity to be partly deliberate, but stresses how it brings to light the resulting loopholes when attempting to draw organizational boundaries in a new context of operations. You are not required to obtain permission to reuse this article in part or whole. /MediaBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] Photo: Defense Dept. It improves operational effectiveness and provides a mechanism to enhance integration and resource development. As Arctic ice recedes and maritime activity increases, the Coast Guard must be prepared to administer and inform national objectives over the long-term. This report summarizes the discussions and findings of the Workshop on Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defence and Resilience organized by the NATO research group IST-152-RTG. The deployment of cyber capabilities has a long history with the French foreign intelligence service The General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) (Gudard Citation2020). /Resources 10 0 R Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00 10 Except for the French Ministry of Defense. People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read. This article provides a first step in closing that gap by offering a dedicated perspective on the organization of offensive cyber capabilities across three European countries. >> Conceptions, Causes and Assessment, A Matter of Time: on the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons, Integrating Offensive Cyber Capabilities: meaning, Dilemmas, and Assessment, Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications, Securing Cyberspace: How States Design Governance Arrangements. This paper explores how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities and provides recommendations for policy and research development in the field. It is seldom distinct where one stage ends, and another begins. 111th Congress (2009-2010), Senate Bill 3480 (S.3480). Report to Congress on the annual long-range plan for construction of naval vessels for fiscal year 2020 prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. stream The responsibilities of the agency include coordinating of the national cyber defense strategy, protecting state information networks,Footnote10 regulating critical infrastructure and the private sector, certifying products, and hosting the national Computing Emergency Response Team. /Filter /FlateDecode This article has demonstrated significant divergence in organizing cyber capabilities across military and intelligence in the Netherlands, France, and Norway. Innovation, and ultimately the success of the naval mission, is based on three fundamental things: People, Information, and Ideas. It was prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities (OPNAV N9) and approved for release by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Fourth, this is par-ticularly true for the harmonisation of crimi - nal law in the fight against cybercrime. 1 DDY d#E& m Drawing out these three models of organizing cyber capabilities and their dominant characteristics, should be considered a starting point for further explorations and discussions of how European countries can and ought to organize their cyber capabilities across intelligence and military entities. /Rotate 0 While the principle of separation is strong on paper, the French organization of cyber capabilities is more complex. endobj . It describes both intelligence and military cyber operations as offensive actions, notes that they are usually carried out in the network of the opponent, and stresses that their execution falls under the responsibility of the chief of the intelligence service (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2014, 6 and 17). Organizing cyber capability between military and intelligence, The Netherlands: organizational collaboration, Conclusion: future paths for policy and research, https://english.defensie.nl/topics/cyber-security/cyber-command, https://www.ihemi.fr/articles/organisation-france-europe-cybersecurite-cyberdefense-V2. LAAD Defence & Security 11 - 14 Apr 2023 | Rio de Janeiro - RJ, . 1 0 obj /ColorSpace 53 0 R Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), NATO Public Diplomacy Divisions Co-Sponsorship Grants. This group teamed with current operational military and civilian experts to compare Navy's cybersecurity governance structures against best practices from both government and industry for alignment of authority, accountability, and responsibility. << 9 0 obj 24 0 R 25 0 R 26 0 R 27 0 R 28 0 R 29 0 R 30 0 R 31 0 R 32 0 R] This paper discusses the need for an agile structure to inform the development of cybersecurity solutions that are not only widely adaptable to unknown threats, specific business practices, and technical requirements, but are also efficiently translatable to products. An additional argument for the centralized model was given by the Ministry of Defense in written communication with the author. The DGSE is the largest French intelligence service in terms of workforce. B-1110 Brussels The primary tasks of the unit are the collection of signal intelligence and the delivery of intelligence through cyber operations. /ProcSet [/PDF /Text /ImageB /ImageC /ImageI] /Annots [11 0 R] Forum Cybersecurity Fellow. This broad perception of offensive capabilities is deliberately chosen to allow for the empirics to speak rather than an overly restrictive pregiven conceptualization. Third, it is paramount to strengthen the awareness of how organizational divergences might hamper collaboration at the level of intelligence sharing, EU cybersecurity governance, and NATO cyber operations. Private Sector Cyber Defense : Can Active Measures Help Stabilize Cyberspace ? NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. It is not publicly disclosed how the human and technical infrastructure resources are pooled in the event of a cyber-attack on the Netherlands surmounting to armed conflict. As paradigmatic cases they were not chosen because of e.g. While the collaboration between ANSSI, COMCYBER, and the French intelligence services is hence likely to increase, neither the desired outcome of the collaboration nor its strategic and practical dimensions are explicated. mt_ C)WvL The EU's Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade. %PDF-1.4 The depiction of cyberspace as a warfighting domain contributed to developing the role of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces in cybersecurity matters. As our future enlisted leaders proceed from the stern to the bow over the course of their careers, making each milestone, they are building the backbone of our future Navy that is enduring and deeply connected to the heritage of those that have gone before us. Third, the proposed measures for increased cyber-security lack legal force. Cyber defence is one of the areas in which the need to step up cooperation is strongest: defence and security is what Europeans ask and expect from their leaders. endstream endobj startxref This rise is arguably fueled by the dramatic increase in ransomware payments. Comprehensive review of Department of the Navy Uniformed Legal Communities from SECNAV Executive Review Panel, Dec. 9, 2019. The collaboration between the DCC and MIVD/JSCU raises strategic and legal issues as the MIVD and JSCU operate under different political and legal mandates. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson released 'A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0,' Dec. 17, 2018. Second, neither consistency in organizational collaboration, separation, nor centralization will automatically translate into efficient operational cyber capabilities to be deployed in intelligence contest, strategic competition, or military confrontation. Registered in England & Wales No. The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. The paper concludes that there is a need for increased political attention and a deliberate approach to how the organizational model allows for the operational cyber capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which political implications at both national and international levels. As part of this clarification, the strategic review formalizes four operational cyber chains and consolidates their governance.
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