The only layer of protection against a catastrophe was therefore the assumption that poorly trained, low-paid maintenance workers would apply enough grease. On the basis of these measurements, the shift supervisors overruled Liotines earlier work order and cleared the plane to fly. If they lost control again, he didnt want to endanger people on the ground. You mean, use this again? Tansky asked, presumably pointing at the trim switches. After months of constant movement back and forth, the tests showed normal wear rates with both grease types. On January 31, 2000, the aircraft operating the route, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 . [11] Of the passengers, one was Mexican and one was British, with all others being U.S. The scenes in this video are from the documentary series Air Crash Investigation.None of them belong to me.https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Airlines_Fl. Based on the time since the last inspection of the jackscrew assembly, the NTSB determined that the acme-nut thread had deteriorated at 0.012 inches (0.30mm) per 1000 flight hours, much faster than the expected wear of 0.001 inches (0.025mm) per 1000 flighthours. All rights reserved. Following the crash and the damning FAA special inspection report, Alaska Airlines overhauled its maintenance program, including through its compliance with a new FAA airworthiness directive mandating that the jackscrew lubrication interval not exceed 650 flight hours. PLANE CRASH, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, Pacific OceanOther Videos:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLqoJItjw7txOS5AjsLzo8x95z9cvoMFxeAlaska Airlines Fl. "[13], Steve Miletich of The Seattle Times wrote that the western portion of Washington "had never before experienced such a loss from a plane crash". About 70 people gathered at . These aircraft immediately contacted the controller. I dont anticipate any big problems once we get a couple of sub systems on the line. As the jackscrew rotates, it moves up or down through the (fixed) acme nut, and this linear motion moves the horizontal stabilizer for the trim system. Well see you at the gate. This would be the last transmission between flight 261 and Alaska Airlines maintenance. The plane dropped from about 31,500ft (9,600m) to between 23,000 and 24,000ft (7,000 and 7,300m) in around 80 seconds. National Geographic gets you closer to the stories that matter and past the edge of what's possible through groundbreaking storytelling. But neither of the applicable checklists said anything about landing at the nearest available airport, and by the time they finished the checklists and leveled off at 31,000 feet, minimal effort was required to keep the plane flying level. At 15:49, after flying for two hours with a jammed stabilizer, Thompson and Tansky contacted Alaskas Seattle maintenance base for advice. As the NTSB investigation continued, so too did the criminal investigation and the saga of John Liotine. First, pressurized grease was to be injected into a special tube on the nut until it filled all the thread gaps between the nut and the jackscrew and started to bulge out the top. Both pilots struggled together to regain control of the aircraft, and only by pulling with 130 to 140 lb (580 to 620 N) on the controls did the flight crew stop the 6,000ft/min (1,800m/min) descent of the aircraft and stabilize the MD-83 at roughly 24,400ft (7,400m). This movement occurs via an electrical motor that turns a two-foot-long steel jackscrew through an aluminum-bronze acme nut held fixed within the vertical fin. Sometime before 15:49 (23:49 UTC), the flight crew contacted the airline's dispatch and maintenance-control facilities in SeaTac, Washington, on a company radio frequency shared with operations and maintenance facilities at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), to discuss a jammed horizontal stabilizer and a possible diversion to LAX. From the best and brightest scientists, explorers, photographers, and filmmakers, Nat Geo is the world's premium destination for science, exploration, and adventure. Upon subsequent examination, the jackscrew was found to have metallic filaments wrapped around it, which were later determined to be the remains of the acme-nut thread. Nine years after the cost-cutting began, Alaska Airlines was posting profits again, its fleet was expanding, and passenger numbers were higher than ever. At their cruising altitude and speed, the position of the jammed stabilizer required the pilots to pull on their yokes with about 10lbf (44N) of force to keep level. This and other evidence suggested to the NTSB that "the SFO mechanic who was responsible for lubricating the jackscrew assembly in September 1999 did not adequately perform the task". The pilots, 53-year-old Captain Ted Thompson and 57-year-old First Officer Bill Tansky, could not have known that they were about to play out the final chapter in a sordid story that had been building toward its conclusion for years. The base confirmed that there werent any known problems with the stabilizer, and the discussion then turned to how to handle the failure. [44][45], As of May 2022, Flight 261 no longer exists, and Alaska Airlines no longer operates the Puerto VallartaSan FranciscoSeattle/Tacoma route. As part of a memorial vigil in 2000, a column of light was beamed from the top of the Space Needle. The tragedy of 261 forced us to change, he said. With the stabilizer angled 3.1 degrees toward nose down, more than the design maximum of 2.5 degrees, flight 261 immediately entered a high-speed dive, hurtling downward at more than 6,000 feet per minute. And so it was that on a sunny day in January 2000, 83 passengers and five crew boarded Alaska Airlines flight 261 in the resort city of Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, bound for San Francisco, California. Alaska flight 261 departed Puerto Vallarta, Mexico at 1:37 pm on January 31, 2000 destined for San Francisco. Testing revealed that the nonstandard tools ("restraining fixtures") used by Alaska Airlines could result in inaccurate measurements and that if accurate measurements had been obtained at the time of the last inspection, these measurements possibly would have indicated the excessive wear and the need to replace the affected components. In the cockpit, the pilots heard a loud clunk followed by two thumps, and the plane pitched steeply downward. The pilots pulled back as hard as they could on their control columns and deployed the flaps to try and slow down, but their efforts were utterly hopeless. The failure was compounded by poor oversight Had any of the managers, mechanics, inspectors, supervisors, or FAA overseers whose job it was to protect this mechanism done their job conscientiously, this accident cannot happen NTSB has made several specific maintenance recommendations, some already accomplished, that will, if followed, prevent the recurrence of this particular accident. Instead it went the other way., What do you think. The MD-83 nosed over, rolled inverted, tumbled downward and impacted the Pacific Ocean at 4:21 pm Pacific Time. It was not designed to handle that kind of pressure, and over those ten minutes, it started to fracture. "[21] Although the CVR captured the co-pilot saying "mayday", no radio communications were received from the flight crew during the final event. In August 1999, Alaska Airlines put Liotine on paid leave,[28] and in 2000, Liotine filed a libel suit against the airline. Air Alaska Flight 261 dives into the ocean shortly after takeoff, killing the 88 passengers and crew on board. Planes inverted sir, a nearby pilot told the controller. A flight traveling from Mexico crashed into the Pacific Ocean on Jan. 31, 2000. However, the plane ran into a streak of at least two or three grease applications that were not done correctly, including one in September 1999 by a notorious San Francisco-based mechanic who was later found to have applied virtually no grease to any of the jackscrews he worked on. [6], End-play checks were conducted during a periodic comprehensive airframe overhaul process called a "Ccheck". This is the only time the award has ever been given posthumously. During the course of the investigation, and later in its final report, the NTSB issued 24 safety recommendations, covering maintenance, regulatory oversight, and aircraft design issues. Home From C-Check to Tragedy: Lessons Learned from Alaska flight 261. Flight 261 was on its way from Puerto Vallarta to San Francisco when a mechanical failure caused it to plunge into the ocean, killing all 88 people on board. A cacophony of banging and roaring filled the cockpit. Then in 1999 Alaska Airlines retaliated against John Liotine, putting him on indefinite leave from his job and circulating false rumors about him; the airline sought to portray him in the media as a disgruntled employee who wanted to get back at supervisors who passed him over for promotion. Also included was a recommendation that pilots were to be instructed that in the event of a flight control system malfunction, they should not attempt corrective procedures beyond those specified in the checklist procedures, and in particular, in the event of a horizontal stabilizer trim control system malfunction, the primary and alternate trim motors should not be activated, and if unable to correct the problem through the checklists, they should land at the nearest suitable airport.[6]. When the stabilizer moves upward, downforce on the tail decreases, and the nose pitches down; similarly, when the stabilizer moves downward, downforce increases, and the nose pitches up. Push and roll! That was the how but the bigger question was why. Almost all of these recommendations were implemented. A big, huge plunge, thank you, said the controller. For the next few minutes, they calculated landing weights and center of gravity and other values while controllers in Los Angeles prepared to accommodate them. Rescue vessels raced to the crash site three kilometers east of Anacapa Island in the Santa Barbara Channel, hoping to find survivors. Flight 261 was on its way from Puerto Vallarta to San Francisco when a mechanical failure caused it to plunge into the ocean, killing all 88 people on board. The actual protocol at Alaska Airlines was to inspect the jackscrew for wear at every second C-check, a comprehensive multi-day inspection that every airplane undergoes approximately once a year. The FAA approved the extension without assessing the effect this would have on individual inspection tasks that were tied to the C-check interval. Three seconds later, the fairing failed, and the stabilizer swung unimpeded on its hinge to a position of at least 14 degrees aircraft nose down. No decision was made at this point about whether or not to divert. [40] In April 2001, John Hay Elementary dedicated the "John Hay Pathway Garden" as a permanent memorial to the students and their families who were killed on Flight 261. And while the airline did eventually settle the suits, it did so only after dragging the families through what many described as a legal hell in which Alaskas lawyers tried to downplay the monetary value of their deceased loved ones. Different speeds and phases of flight require the stabilizer to apply varying amounts of downforce on the tail in order to keep the plane level, and further adjustments must be made to ensure that the pilots dont have to continuously pull up or push down using the elevators in order to climb or descend. Tragically, they didnt. Many of Alaskas maintenance workers received on the job training only without any formal curriculum. Alaska two sixty one, say again sir, said the controller. Therefore the interval between jackscrew inspections was effectively increased from 26 to 30 months without the FAA spending a single minute looking into whether or not this was appropriate. (To avoid confusion, from here on out nose up and nose down, as they relate to the pitch of the airplane, will be used to describe the stabilizers direction of motion. Less than one second later, Alaska Airlines flight 261 slammed into the Pacific Ocean, obliterating the aircraft and instantly killing all 88 people on board. He's, ah, down. The green grease did appear to be more wet to me. Im thinking, can it get any worse, but it probably can, he continued. In hindsight, the crew should have turned around and immediately landed back in Puerto Vallarta. Join the discussion of this article on Reddit! Flight 261 immediately plunged into a near-vertical dive, hurtling downward toward the Pacific Ocean. With the jackscrew completely separated from the nut, aerodynamic forces acting on the stabilizer pushed it up beyond the normal full nose down position, halting only when the mechanical stop on the bottom of the jackscrew slammed into the nut. On January 31st, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 suddenly nosedived into the Pacific Ocean and the crash had deadly implications. What a hard way to die: so an airline can make more money., ________________________________________________________________. Language links are at the top of the page across from the title. Still, the pilots did not give up; Thompson thought it might be possible to roll out right-side-up using the rudder. "[21] ATC then tried to contact the plane. [46][47] The airline retired the last of its MD-80s in 2008 and now uses Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s for these routes.[48]. Yeah, we got it back under control here.. I need everything picked up and everybody strapped down, he said, cause Im gonna unload the airplane and see if we can gain control of it that way. His intention was to fly at lower speeds where there would be less aerodynamic force pushing up on the stabilizer. Let me just try it, Tansky said, offering to take over the strenuous task of holding the plane level. At 15:55, the dispatcher returned with wind speeds, wind directions, and runway conditions at San Francisco and Los Angeles. [29] In December 2001, federal prosecutors stated that they were not going to file criminal charges against Alaska Airlines. [6], Systemic problems were identified by the investigation into the FAA's oversight of maintenance programs, including inadequate staffing, its approval process of maintenance interval extensions, and the aircraft certification requirements. For Alaska Airlines, the crash of Flight 261 into the Pacific Ocean one year ago this week brought down not just a plane but an entire way of operating: fast-growing, brash and full of. Were gonna stay up here and burn a little more gas, get all our ducks in a row, and then well be talking to LAX when we start down to go in there. The plan was to stay on course a little longer, burning fuel to reduce their landing weight and test out the planes handling capabilities, before turning around and heading into Los Angeles. Like its earlier DC-9 variant, longitudinal trim control for the MD-80 is provided by the 40-foot-wide horizontal stabilizer mounted atop a vertical fin in a T-tail configuration. It was clear that nobody had survived the crash. [19]:69 During this time, the flight crew considered, and rejected, any further attempts to correct the runaway trim. Fuck me!. The flight originated in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, and was bound for Seattle with an intermediate stop in San Francisco. It was on board Alaska Airlines flight 261 from Puerto Vallarta to San Francisco on the 31st of January 2000 that this sequence of events that had been years in the making finally came to its terrifying conclusion. [6], Due to the extreme impact forces, only a few bodies were found intact,[5] and none were visually identifiable. The Gulf of California stretched out below them, bright and blue. Alaska Airlines' extension of its lubrication interval for its McDonnell Douglas MD-80 horizontal stabilizer components, and the FAA's approval of that extension, the last of which was based on McDonnell Douglas's extension of the recommended lubrication interval, increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in the near complete deterioration of the jackscrew-assembly acme-nut threads, and therefore, was a direct cause of the excessive wear and contributed to the Alaska Airlines Flight 261 accident; Alaska Airlines's extended end-play check interval and the FAA's approval of that extension, allowed the acme-nut threads to deteriorate to the point of failure without the opportunity for detection; The absence on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 of a fail-safe mechanism to prevent the catastrophic effects of total acme nut loss. [6], A special inspection conducted by the NTSB in April 2000 of Alaska Airlines uncovered widespread significant deficiencies that "the FAA should have uncovered earlier". Yeah, I heard it, said Thompson. It is clear is that the events of January 31, 2000, forever changed Alaska Airlines, making it a different airline than the one that existed on that day. [6], Alaska 261 informed air traffic control (ATC) of their control problems. 43:44. On February 9, 1982, while on final approach, the captain disabled the engines and turned off the autopilot, causing the plane to crash just short of the runway. "[6]:9 Over the next minute, completely inverted and still diving at a -9 degree pitch, the crew struggled to roll the plane, with the captain calling to "push push pushpush the blue side up," "ok now lets kick rudderleft rudder left rudder", to which the copilot responded, "I can't reach it". Performing an upset recovery maneuver, the captain commanded to "push and roll, push and roll," managing to increase the pitch to -28 degrees, he stated, "ok, we are invertedand now we gotta get it. Okay, right rudder, right rudder, said Thompson. The outcomes of wrongful death suits against Alaska filed by the victims families are unknown, but it has been reported that the airline eventually settled with the families out of court for a total of at least $300 million, all of which was covered by insurance. The aircraft designers assumed that at least one set of threads would always be present to carry the loads placed on it; therefore, the effects of catastrophic failure of this system were not considered, and no "fail-safe" provisions were needed. Since each lubrication or end-play check subsequently not conducted had represented an opportunity to adequately lubricate the jackscrew or detect excessive wear, the NTSB examined the justification of these extensions. To evaluate what role grease played in the accelerated wear of the jackscrew, the NTSB formed a Grease Group and conducted standardized tests on both Aeroshell 33 and Mobilgrease 28. Most importantly, the National Transportation Safety Board excoriated Alaska Airlines decision to increase the intervals between jackscrew lubrications and wear inspections, and the FAAs approval of these intervals, which it considered to be a direct cause of the accident. But over the next two decades, Alaska Airlines pursued an aggressive strategy of expansion, aiming to become an affordable option for travelers throughout the Western United States. As then-Board Member John Goglia wrote in the NTSB final report, This was a maintenance accidentmore pure than any others.. The names of Morris Thompson and Ronald and Joyce Lake were used in schemes unrelated to them. As far as the pilots were concerned, the electric motors had probably seized and they could fly on to San Francisco without trimming the stabilizer. Both the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew (also referred to as "acme screw") and the corresponding acme nut, through which the jackscrew turns, were found. Japan Air Lines Flight 350 was a domestic flight flown by a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61, registered as JA8061, from Fukuoka Airport in Fukuoka to Haneda Airport in Tokyo. Indeed, all seemed normal as flight 261 climbed out from Puerto Vallarta, heading for its cruising altitude of 31,000 feet. And then, as the plane passed through 23,400 feet, a warning light flicked on in the cockpit: AUTOPILOT TRIM, it said. However, during the 1990s the quality of maintenance at Alaska Airlines began to slip significantly. On the 31st of January 2000, an Alaska Airlines MD-83 bound for San Francisco suddenly plunged from the sky off the coast of California, spiraling downward until it slammed into the Pacific Ocean. There are so many emotions attached to Jan. 31, the date 20 years ago now that Alaska Airlines Flight 261 plunged into the Pacific Ocean, killing 88 people, including her parents, Tom. This article is written without reference to and supersedes the original. Navy. It was the first sign that something was in fact gravely wrong with their airplane. gakirah barnes death video; Financial Planning. But in the end he was forced to accept a mere $500,000 settlement, far less than the $20 million he had sought, and only then on the condition that he resign from his job. Okay, we are inverted, and now we gotta get it. [37] Candy Hatcher of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer wrote: "Many lost faith in Alaska Airlines, a homegrown company that had taken pride in its safety record and billed itself as a family airline. SkyWest 5154, you still got your eyes on him, sir?. This tail surface is a critical flight control because it provides a constant aerodynamic balancing force and also aids in controlling the airplanes nose-up and down movement when commanded by the pilots (see graphics 1 & 2). It was really tough there for a while.. Laboratory tests indicated that the excessive wear of the jackscrew assembly could not have accumulated in just the four-month period between the September 1999 maintenance and the accident flight. In addition to the probable cause, the NTSB found these contributing factors:[6] Yeah, we tried everything together, said Thompson. But the measurements were imprecise and repeated tests often produced different results allowing a certain amount of ambiguity as to whether the value was over or under the limit. He is, uh, definitely in a nose down, uh, position, descending quite rapidly. You got it?. Uh, if you want to try it, thats ok with me, if not, thats fine. Thats affirm, said Thompson. But as the airline began cutting costs over the following decade, one of the areas that got put on the chopping block was maintenance. [6]:11 Thompson had flown for Alaska Airlines for 18 years and Tansky for 15; neither pilot had been involved in an accident or incident prior to the crash. But this very success may have planted the seeds of the disaster which followed. As such, it is critically important that the jackscrew be kept in good working order, primarily through the liberal application of grease at regular intervals. The last minutes of those on board the doomed MD-83 would have been sheer hell, as the plane went inverted, corkscrewed, pirouetted, and spun like a top during its final dive. [6]:9[21], The CVR transcript reveals the pilots' constant attempts for the duration of the dive to regain control of the aircraft. [6], Between 1985 and 1996, Alaska Airlines progressively increased the period between both jackscrew lubrication and end-play checks, with the approval of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). On December 22, 1998, federal authorities raided an Alaska Airlines property and seized maintenance records. Did it happen went in reverse? Tansky asked. The block-on-ring test rigs were lubricated with grease where they made contact. The crew scrambled to react to the massive upset. It was my job to find out. It was no wonder, given these findings, why Alaska Airlines mechanics didnt know how to grease the jackscrew, and why nobody held them accountable for not doing so properly. It began life as a regional airline in Alaska, and by the time deregulation arrived in the late 1970s, it only had one destination in the lower 48 states. When greased regularly, the nut on the MD-80 series is designed to last for 30,000 flight hours before requiring replacement long enough that most planes will see only two or three different jackscrew nuts during their entire time in service. But why did the acme nut threads fail? We have a jammed stabilizer and were maintaining altitude with difficultyour intention is to land at Los Angeles, Thompson radioed to approach control. Stepping on the rudder pedals while upside down was no easy task. In September 2000, he filed a $20 million libel lawsuit against Alaska Airlines, arguing that he had been right all along and that Alaska had maliciously harmed his reputation. Many did not apply grease to the entire length of the jackscrew as per the procedure. Not that I want to go on about it you know, it just blows me away they think were gonna land, theyre gonna fix it, now theyre worried about the flow. By contrast, Boeings recommended interval was every 30 months or 7,200 flight hours, whichever came first. Had it been inspected after 7,200 flight hours instead of 9,550, the excessive wear would have been discovered before the crash. If done correctly, the process took about four hours. The effect was immediate and catastrophic, as his inputs ripped out whatever threads remained on the jackscrew nut. On January 31st, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 suddenly nosedived into the Pacific Ocean and the crash had deadly implications. In interviews with the Alaska Airlines mechanic at SFO, who last performed the lubrication, the task was shown to take about one hour, whereas the aircraft manufacturer estimated the task should take four hours. We also discovered that the airline, with no objection from the FAA, was allowed to extend the end play check interval years before the accident (see graphic 9). Technical logs fell through the cracks; critical forms were left incomplete; paperwork was outright falsified to show work done when it was not. A flight attendant opened the cockpit door, and Captain Thompson briefed her on the situation. As a result, Alaska Airlines slowly increased the interval between jackscrew lubrications from 500 flight hours in 1987 to every eight months (approximately 2,250 flight hours) in 1999. [6] The captain then replied "ok right rudderright rudder," followed 18 seconds later by "gotta get it over againat least upside down we're flying. Uh, you getting full nose trim down but are you getting any you dont get no nose trim up, is that correct? maintenance asked.
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